Worth 43 minutes of your time.
Important to understand going forward.

Players in Drop

Research Links

8Chan Noteable

Mike Pence’s talk at the Hudson Institute reveals the important influence that Michael Pillsbury’s thinking has had on Trump’s China policy. Pillsbury’s book title “100 Year Marathon” refers to China’s plan for world hegemony by 2049, 100 years on from Mao’s Chinese Revolution. Some quotes from the book: “If the contrast between the Chinese ”Warring States” mind-set and a traditional American view of the world can be distilled into a single, fundamental difference, it is this: Americans tend to believe that relations with other countries ebb and flow between periods of competition and cooperation; Beijing’s assumption is that the U.S. government has a long-standing policy of hostility and deception toward the Chinese government…. Their distrust of the United States is therefore unlikely to change.” “One central thesis of this book depends on growing evidence that the hawks have successfully persuaded the Chinese leadership to view America as a dangerous hegemon that it must replace. This view gained authority in 1989, and as a result Beijing started systematically to demonize the U.S. government to the Chinese people.” “After Tiananmen Square in 1989, Deng chose to align with Li Peng and other hard-liners to solidify Party control. Never again, the leaders vowed, would China’s students build Statues of Liberty, quote from the Declaration of Independence, and look to America’s values as admirable alternatives to those of the Chinese Communist Party. Within a year, textbooks had been rewritten to cast America as China’s archvillain, and new policies and regulations ensured that only this official view of America made it into China’s classrooms and libraries.” “The frightening thing is that they actually believe their own propaganda. At first, it seemed impossible to me that any thinking person in China would believe that American presidents from John Tyler to Barack Obama had all somehow learned the statecraft axioms of the Warring States period and decided to apply these little-known concepts to control China. But then I realized that many in China think of these axioms as universal truths. They know America is the most powerful nation in the world, and they assume America will act as selfishly, cynically, and ruthlessly as did every hegemon in the era of the Warring States.” ““Beijing sees the U.S. as an inevitable foe, and is planning accordingly,” I stated in the article. “We’d be remiss not to take that into account.” Elsewhere I said that “we must start with the acknowledgment, at least, that we are unprepared to understand Chinese thinking. And then we must acknowledge that we are facing in China what may become the largest challenge in our nation’s history.” This, needless to say, was not the line favored by those in Beijing. Almost immediately, I fell into Beijing’s disfavor. My access to Chinese generals and academics vanished.” ““The mastery of outer space will be a prerequisite for naval victory with outer space becoming the new commanding heights for naval combat.… The side with electromagnetic combat superiority will make full use of that Assassin’s Mace weapon to win naval victory.” They called for China to pioneer in “Assassin’s Mace weapons” such as tactical laser weapons, which “will be used first in antiship missile defense systems,” and stealth technology for both naval ships and cruise missiles. “Lightning attacks and powerful first strikes will be more widely used,” they noted. In addition, the authors listed a host of tactics that would be essential against a superpower like the United States, such as assaulting radar and radio stations with smart weapons; jamming enemy communication facilities via electronic warfare; attacking communication centers, facilities, and command ships; destroying electronic systems with electromagnetic pulse weapons; wiping out computer software with computer viruses; and developing directed-energy weapons.” “Another key difference I discovered when reviewing People’s Liberation Army materials and documents was that China is prepared to use what it calls a “warning strike” that would increase shi and tilt the flow of events in China’s favor. Da ji zeng shi, a term that appears in Chinese military texts and is discussed among military insiders, means “strike with force to increase shi.” While China has historically not used force for territorial conquest, it has instead done so for political motives of a different sort: to achieve psychological shock, reverse a crisis situation, or establish a fait accompli. As in the surprise intervention against U.S. and UN forces in Korea in 1950 and in surprise offensives against its neighbors India (in 1962), the Soviet Union (in 1969), and Vietnam (in 1979), Chinese military leaders believe that the preemptive surprise attack can mean the difference in determining the outcome of a military confrontation and can set the terms for a broader political debate (such as a territorial dispute).”